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Divorce, Tax-Style
By ALAN L FELD
In response to the "sham divorce" tactic, the IRS recently issued
Revenue Ruling 76-255. The author, professor of law at Boston University
School of Law, although sympathetic with the IRS's position in
the Ruling, poin4s out situations where the divorce-remarriage may possibly
be considered valid because of the existence of nontax effects.

N REVENUE RULING 76-2551 the Internal Revenue Service
blocked taxpayer self-help against the -so-called tax on marriage.
The Service's ruling casts a cloud over tax-motivated divorces. The
proper dimensions of the cloud, however, remain to be delineated.

Background
In 1969 Congress addressed itself to an apparent tax discrimination against single individual taxpayers. As the tax law -had stood
since 1948, a single individual taxpayer could reduce his federal income
tax bill substantially by marrying a spouse with no income, filing a
joint return and enjoying the benefits of the statutory income-splitting thereby conferred. The tax saving resulted from halving the
progressivity of the income tax. In the late 1960s, this result was
decried as discriminating against single individuals with. the same
income. The 1969 amendments 2 provided a separate and lower rate
schedule for single individuals. Married persons continued -to use the
older and higher rates, even when filing separately. The result was to
reduce the benefits of joint return filing if a taxpayer married a nonincome-earning spouse and, thereby, reduce the injustice to single
taxpayers.
Unfortunately, this change created a new and different kind of
inequity. Under the earlier law, if two single taxpayers earning approximately the same amount of income got married, their combined
tax bill would have remained about the same. But under the new provisions, their tax bill could increase substantially, primarily because
I. R. B. 1976-28, 7.

769

Also issued as News Release IR-1632, July 1, 1976,

CCH-STANARD FEDERAL TAX REPORTS

6728.

'Tax Reform Act of 1969, Sec. 803.

608

October, 1976 *

T A X E S-

The Tax Magazine

engaging theme that has received
publication in the media. Publicity
doubtless has produced some embarrassment. In response, the Service has
issued Revenue Ruling 76-255. Situation two, described in the Revenue
Ruling, concerns a married couple
who obtain a divorce on December
30 in a foreign jurisdiction. The divorce is assumed by the Ruling to be
valid. However, at the time of the
divorce, they intend to remarry and
do so in January -of the following
year. The Ruling states that neither
Section 143 nor Section 6013 contemplates a sham transaction designed to
Some married taxpayers who were manipulate marital status 'as of the
aware of this disparity also noticed close of the year. Naturally, Gregory
that the Internal Revenue Code gen- v. Helvering 7 is cited in support of
erally determines marital status as of this unobjectionable statement. The
the end of the year.5 A few of these Ruling goes on to hold that therefore
taxpayers acted on this observation. the divorce described in situation two
They obtained a divorce at the end of is of no tax effect and the parties are
December, so as to be unmarried as deemed to be married for the earlier
of the end of the year, intending to year.
remarry early in January of the folAs one law professor was wont to
lowing year, which they did. The say, "I understand everything but the
cost of a trip to a receptive Caribbean 'therefore.'" The question of whether
jurisdiction in order to obtain -the the divorce is a sham can hardly be
divorce was far less than the tax sav- determined solely by the tax reduction
ings involved.6
intention of the parties. Gregory is
also frequently cited for the proposiRevenue Ruling 76-255
tion that a taxpayer may take approRegrettably for the practitioners of priate steps to reduce his tax bill. To
this tactic, tax-inspired divorce is an sink to the level of a sham, the transof the higher-than-single rate schedule now being applied. For example,
if two single lawyers, each making
$32,000 taxable income, were to get
married, their combined federal income tax bill now would increase by
$3,840 from $20,580 to $24,420. In
addition, part of the total standard
deduction previously available might
disappear: the maximum standard
deduction for a married couple was
less than twice the maximum for a
single individual.3 For tax purposes,.
it was manifestly more blessed to be
single than married where both
4
parties earned substantial income.

'For 1975 the maximum percentage standard deduction for a single individual was
$2300 and for a married couple was $2600.
"At the same time, where the incomes of
the two individuals were disparate, marriage
continued to confer a tax break, although
of reduced magnitude.
'Sec. 6013(d)(1)(A) makes this the rule
for joint return filing and Sec. 143(a) does
so for standard deduction purposes. The
tax rate tables incorporate the definitions
of Sec. 143.
' It is believed that no taxpayer has sought
to deduct the cost of the divorce trip as an
expense in connection with determining a
tax, Sec. 212(3).
'35-1 usc 19043, 293 U. S. 465. In
Gregory, the taxpayer's corporation (United)
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owned stock in a second corporation (Monitor) which the taxpayer wanted to sell.
Had United distributed the Monitor stock
it would have been a dividend. Instead,
United formed a new corporation, Averill,

transferred the Monitor stock to it and
distributed the new Averill shares to the
taxpayer, all apparently in compliance with
provisions for no gain or loss. Taxpayer
then liquidated Averill at a claimed capital
gain, instead of a dividend. The Second
Circuit and the Supreme Court held there
was a dividend nevertheless.
It is testimony to the peculiar strength
of our legal logic that a classic case concerning the tax effects of a corporate division is the sole authority offered to characterize a marital division.

action must approach an illusion, that
is, it must be little more than play acting for the tax collector without substantial impact elsewhere. The Tax
Court recently has synthesized these
aspects of sham-ness in'a hands-on
metaphor: "The building may not be
constructed entirely from the tax advantage, but, if the foundation and
bricks have economic substance, the
economic or financial inducement of
the tax advantage can provide the
mortar." 8

On this view, the divorce and remarriage should be treated as a sham
and disregarded if -the only effect of
the transactions was to reduce the
taxes of the parties. To the extent
that the marriage and divorce have
nontax effects, it -should be substantially more difficult to describe the
transaction as a sham. Thus, if a
married couple decided to take a long
New Year's weekend trip to Haiti,
getting a divorce on the Thursday
they arrive and remarrying on the
following Monday before they leave,
and return to the United States with
these two pieces of paper, the easiest
case for 'sham treatment could be put.
On the other hand, if they return unmarried and some interval passes in
which there may be nontax effects
attaching to their single state, the result becomes more problematical. Indeed, if the nontax consequences are
'W. Lee McLane, Jr., CCH Dec. 27,933,
46 TC 140, 145 (1966), aff'd per curiam
67-2 us-rc 119491, 377 F. 2d 557 (CA-9).
'The validity of the divorce for state law
purposes is assumed in the Ruling. While
invalidity of the divorce would obviate any
ta effect, the reverse does not follow.
" The same question would apply as to
the "widow's mite," homestead allowance or
statutory forced share. See, e. g., Uniform
Probate Code Secs. 2-201, 2-402 and 2-401.
" Under the Uniform Probate Code Sec.
2-508, divorce revokes will provisions favoring the former spouse but reinstates them
on remarriage.
" The Service recently litigated a number
of marital deduction cases to determine
which of two possible survivors is the sur-

substantial, the divorce should be respected though the interval be short.
Nontax Effects
A number of nontax effects are possible. For example, if one of the parties
died in the interim period, would the
survivor be a surviving spouse for state
intestacy purposes," for purposes of
passing property under the decedent's
will,"' or even for purposes of the federal estate tax marital deduction? 12
Would coverage under disability, medical.or other insurance policies lapse,
at least temporarily? Would termination of the marriage convert property
held in a tenancy by the entireties into
a tenancy in common unless this result expressly is negated? 13 In a
community property state, would the
divorce sever community property and
would it remain separate property upon
the remarriage ? 14 Would the divorce
revoke will provisions in favor of a
surviving spouse which the remarriage
would not reinstate? 15 To the extent
that such nonincome tax consequences
followed from the divorce and from
the subsequent marriage, the divorce
was not a sham -as that word; was
usually understood and should not be
ignored for tax purposes. More affirmatively, the divorce is real for tax purposes to the extent it is meaningful
outside the closed world of income
taxes. Of course, the desirability of
viving spouse. In those cases the decedent
or the claimed survivor had a prior marriage
which was dissolved by a divorce whose
validity is upheld in some jurisdictions and
attacked in others. Est. of Spalding v.
Commissioner, 76-2 usTc f 13,144 (CA-2);
Est. of Goldwater v. Commissioner, 76-2 usrc
13,146 (CA-7); and Est. of Steffke, 76-2
usTc

1 13,145 (CA-7).

"See Bernatavicius v. Bernatavicius, 259
Mass. 486 (1927); but see Finn v. Finn, 348
Mass. 443 (1965).
" Coffer v. Lightford, 129 Cal. App. 2d
191, 276 P. 2d 618 (1954).
"In re Est of Guess, 213 S. 2d 638 (Fla.
App. 1968); but see Uniform Probate Code
Sec. 2-508.
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such a divorce in order to save income
taxes diminishes as these effects
multiply.
One can appreciate the Service's
dilemma. If a couple is married most
of the time it seems fair to treat them
as married for tax purposes. Yet, for
convenience, the Code prescribes that
marital status is determined not by
the experience during the majority of
the tax year but by marital status on
the last day of the tax year. Understandably, efforts by taxpayers to alter their marital status only on that
day are of concern, lest they distort
the intended tax scheme. But there
are other areas where -tax effects turn
on characterizing something at a single
moment in time. For example, when
a taxpayer sells stock at year-end to
recognize gain or loss, the fact that
he intends to reinvest early next year
in the same stock arguably might prevent recognition, by requiring that we
ignore the sale. In fact, except for -the
statutory wash sale or sale to related

parties restrictions," it is quite difficult
to set aside a sale and purchase as of
no effect, if the taxpayer suffered some
investment risk. But where the sale
has no economic substance apart from
taxes, such action is justified- If the
divorce-remarriage is analogous, we

should be chary of disturbing a valid
divorce which occasioned real-world
effects.
The theory of the Revenue Ruling
must be that a divorce, otherwise valid,
will not be given tax effect where the
parties intend to undo the effects of
the divorce shortly thereafter and do
so. This approach is troublesome on
two grounds. First, it raises the problems of deciding tax consequences by
the subjective 'state of mind of the
"Code Secs. 1091(a) and 267(a)(1).
"See E. Keith Owens, CCH Dec. 33,127,
64 TC 1 (1975).
"For a more elaborate statement of the
effects of states of mind on tax results see
Blum, "Motive, Intent and Purpose in
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parties.18 In the easiest case, where
the effects of the divorce are limited to
a short interim period, we might feel
relatively confident in drawing conclusions as to intent. A reasonable
couple might divorce and remarry for
tax savings and run the risk of death
during the short "single" period. As
the interval between divorce and remarriage enlarges, and other effects
multiply, however, doubts quickly
emerge as to !the primacy of the tax
avoidance motive as compared- with
other motives. Our hypothetical reasonable couple is far less likely to dismiss
the consequences of being unmarried
for a longer period. A conclusion that
the parties never intended to be divorced must rely on an exploration of
what they said and did.
A second cause for doubt as to the
Service's conclusion is the purpose of
the rule which measures married status
as of the end of the year. The Gregory
case would seem to direct us to the
purpose of the relevant tax provisions.
Whatever else that Delphic opinion did,
it compared the transactions before it
with the legislative intent, and it concluded that Congress did not mean to
include the transaction before it in the
favored treatment. A weekend divorceremarriage on which nothing else turns
should receive a similar negative assessment: Congress probably did not intend to treat as single a husband and
wife who pass through a Caribbean
revolving door. As the interval of the
unmarried period enlarges and realworld risks and effects attach to the
divorce, this result becomes more dubious. One could argue that part of
the convenience Congress sought to
obtain by designating a single day to
measure marital status was the avoidFederal
Chicago
Motive
Studies
1938).

Income Taxation," 34 University of
Law Review, 485 (1967); Paul,
and Intent in Federal Tax Law
in Federal Taxation, 255 (2d ed.

ance of controversy concerning the
subjective elements which tend to
establish marital relationships.
Conclusion
Congress could of course alter this
statutory arrangement as it wished.
It could change the present rule determining marital status on the last
day of the year for all individual taxpayers. It could create an exception
to that rule nullifying for tax purposes
divorce and remarriage between the

same individuals. It could even reexamine its 1969 amendments to eliminate the income tax pressures which
underlie tax-motivated divorces. Meanwhile, the miasma emitted by the Revenue Ruling ought sufficiently to befog
the end-of-year divorce ploy to discourage its use. For taxpayers willing
to test the ruling in a courtroom challenge involving a divorce-remarriage
with some substance, however, the
temporarily single state may -have its
[The End]
tax rewards.

TAX MEETINGS
Independent Accountants Association of Illinois.-The 27th Annual Tax
Seminar will take place December 2-4,
1976, at the Ramada O'Hare Inn, in
Des Plaines, Illinois. Commissioner
Donald Alexander will be a featured
luncheon speaker.
Registration fees are $70 for IAAI
members; $55 for employees of IAAI
members; and $125 for nonmembers.
Further information may be obtained
from Patricia W. Scott, Executive
Secretary, Independent Accountants
Association of Illinois, 726 South College Street, Springfield, Illinois 62704.
Florida Accountants Association.The Annual Tax Institute is scheduled
for Novembeer 28-Decerrber 1, 1976,
at the Dutch Inn, in Orlando. This
year's presentations will place special
emphasis on the Tax Reform Act of
1976.
The registration fee is $85 for members and $125 for nonmembers. Furtfher details may be obtained from
Gordon M. Wiggin, Executive Director, Florida Accountants Association, 2120 S. W. 23rd Avenue, Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida 33312.
Kentucky Society of CPAs.-The
19th Annual Institute on Federal
Taxation will take place December
9-10, 1976, at the Gault House Hotel,
in Louisville.
612

Further details may be obtained
from Marvin L. Fishman, 19th Annual
Kentucky Institute on Federal Taxation, c/o Arthur Young & Company,
2707 Citizens Plaza, Louisville, Kentucky 40202.
Wisconsin Institute of CPAs.-The
40th Annual Clinic will take place
November 12, 1976, at the Pfister
Hotel in Milwaukee. Topics to be
covered include Recent Developments
and Current Legislation, Current
Techniques in Executive Compensation; Problems and Planning for Related Business Entities; Estate Planning for Executives in Closely Held
Corporations; Tax Ramifications of
Securities Transactions; and Tax Shelters-Escape.
Further details may be otbained
from David A. Hart, Publicity Chairman, 40th Annual Tax Clinic of the
Wisconsin Institute of CPAs, c/o
Broesch, Jannsen & Hart, S. C., 1001
Madison Avenue, South Milwaukee,
Wisconsin 53172.
Canadian Tax Foundation.-The
28th Annual Conference will take
place November 22-23, 1976, at the
Hotel Vancouver, Vancouver.
Further details may be obtained
from the Secretary, Canadian Tax
Foundation, 100 University Avenue,
Toronto, Ontario M5J 1V6.
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